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John Flaig  |  05/12/2011

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Myth or Mythunderstanding

Implications of the economic design of control charts

In the article, “Four Control Chart Myths from Foolish Experts,” by Davis Balestracci (Quality Digest Daily, March 30, 2011) the following comments were made regarding what Balestracci considers statistical process control (SPC) myths:

Myth No. 4: Three standard deviation limits are too conservative.
Reality: Walter A. Shewhart, the originator of the control chart, deliberately chose three standard deviation limits. He wanted limits wide enough so that people wouldn’t waste time interpreting noise as signals (a Type I error). He also wanted limits narrow enough to detect an important signal that people shouldn't miss (avoiding a Type II error). In years of practice he found, empirically, that three standard deviation limits provided a satisfactory balance between these two mistakes. My experience has borne this out as well. I’ve seen two standard deviation limits commonly used because people, especially in medicine, are obsessed that they might ‘miss something.’”

The real reality

The people in medicine were right, and the statistician should have listened to them because they clearly understood Shewhart’s thinking better than the author.

As Shewhart wrote on page 276 of his book, Economic Control of Quality of Manufactured Product, (D. Van Nostrand Co., 1931):

“How then shall we establish allowable limits on the variability of samples? Obviously, the basis for such limits must be, in the last analysis, empirical. Under such conditions it seems reasonable to choose limits q1 and q2 on some statistic such that the associated probability P is economic in the sense now to be explained. If more than one statistic is used, then the limits of all statistics should be chosen so that the probability of looking for trouble when any one of the chosen statistics falls outside its own limits is economic.”

Now while Shewhart was concerned with Type 1 and Type 2 error rates, he was smart enough, being trained as a physicist, to recognize that the error rate was only half of the issue. The other half was the cost of sampling, testing, and product failure. So even if the error rate is small if the cost per failure is large, then we must try to prevent the failure from happening. We do this by selecting a sample size, a sampling frequency, and control limits that reflect the economic risk we are exposing ourselves to. Three sigma limits are a reasonable choice for the average economic risk, but the average may not address the economic extremes very well.

Therefore, beginning with the seminal work of A. J. Duncan, Ph.D., in “The Economic Design of X-Bar Charts Used to Maintain Current Control of a Process ” (Journal of American Statistical Association, Vol. 51), there has been extensive research on the economic design of control charts. D.C. Montgomery, Ph.D., showed that under the assumptions of the Duncan model for the mean control chart:
• The magnitude of the process shift that we wish to detect are largely determined by the sample size.
• The sampling frequency is mainly caused by the penalty cost of production in the out-of-control state and the rate of occurrence of the search for assignable cause signals.
• The width of the control limits is chiefly affected by the cost of looking for assignable causes.
• The mean control chart should not be arbitrarily designed. [Montgomery, 1980]

So what are the implications of the economic design of control charts, and do they support the “one size fits all” concept of control chart design? The answer is no, as Montgomery stated, for in literally hundreds of peer-reviewed research papers, we see optimal economic designed charts with control limits that range from 1 to 4 sigma limits. However, like any model you have to apply good judgment when generating an economic model because getting reasonable cost estimates can be a daunting task.

For example, consider the heart pacemaker manufacturing case. Suppose we are sampling the process and performing an electrical test at a rate of five units per hour, computing the average, and plotting the result on a trend chart, when an observation arises that appears to be significantly different from our historical experience. The question is, should we search for assignable causes? To answer this question, we need to know how unusual the observation is and the costs of searching for an assignable cause vs. the cost we might face if we don’t search.

The cost of searching for an assignable cause in this case would probably mean sending the suspect unit to the lab, where electronic tests would be performed to validate the unusual observation, and microscopic inspection of the unit or other tests might be performed to try and to identify the causes of failure.

Suppose the unit has low output strength due to a cold solder joint, and the cost of searching and finding the cause is about $1,000. Now, assume that the unusual unit was not captured in a sample of the process production, and thus there was no indication of a problem on our trend chart, and hence no search was performed. The suspect unit would be encapsulated and the pacemaker placed in a patient, where it might fail catastrophically and the patient die. The cost of not searching is then perhaps $10 million in the civil litigation and significant negative publicity.

The cost ratio of inspection cost to field-failure cost is $1,000/$10,000,000 = 1 × 10–4. Now the test cost is small, and the search cost of $1,000 is still a small percentage of the field-failure cost. So what should we do? We have a production line making product that is cheap to test, but we are only checking five units per hour. So we apply W. Edwards Deming’s acceptance sampling rule: If the process fraction defective is greater than the break-even point (BEP), then do 100-percent inspection; otherwise, do no inspection. The BEP is the ratio of inspection cost to field-failure cost, which in this case is tiny. If the defect rate is p = 0.001, then clearly we are above the break-even point, so 100 percent is justified.

Let’s see what the Duncan model says about designing an optimal economic control chart for the pacemaker production process. Using Chiu’s model [Chiu, 1974] we use the cost data from the first example given by Duncan p. 236, where d = 2, l = 0.01, e = 0.05, D = 2, T = 50, W = 25, b = 0.50, c = 0.10, and M = 100 are the increase in the cost-of-escape failures per hour.

The optimal economic design for the mean control for this process is:
n = 5, h = 1.4, k = 3.2, where n is the subgroup sample size, h is the time between samples, and k is the sigma multiplier for the control limit.

Now, suppose we change M from 100 to 10,000, then h drops to 0.14, an order of magnitude decrease. So as M goes to infinity, h goes to zero. This tells us we need to do 100-percent sampling. However, our original process had a subgroup size n = 5, so we change this to n = 1, and this changes the economically optimal control limit value to from k = 3.2 to k = 0.7. So it looks like you should select a control limit multiplier that is less than 3 in this case if you want to save money, not kill anybody, and stay out of court.

In “Weakness of the Economic Design of Control Charts” (Technometrics, 1986, Vol. 28), author W. H. Woodall, Ph.D., points out some of the potential problems with economic-designed control charts, and his concerns need to be addressed. For example, some plans may have high false-alarm rates (like the pacemaker example). This can certainly be a problem for humans, but if the search for assignable causes can be automated, then it should not undermine operator confidence in the control tool. At the other extreme, if field-failure cost is low, the control limit may be high enough to allow many defects to escape, which can destroy the customer’s confidence in the product. This is why it is critically important to try and capture the intangible cost of customer dissatisfaction (i.e., negative advertising, and civil liability) in the field-failure cost. Further, some economic plans can have poor statistical performance (i.e., poor ARLo and ARLx). The application of some simple common sense guidelines (see notes below) can usually reduce these risks to tolerable levels and make economically designed control charts significantly less risky than adopting the one-size-fits-all approach.

This view fits perfectly with Shewhart’s pragmatic economic view of a control chart as a statistical heuristic to distinguish the two types of variation. The control limits were developed as a guide to help the practitioner decide when it was economically reasonable to expend resources in the search for assignable causes.

Note: If the economic model recommends large subgroups sizes n > 12, just default to n = 12 and reduce h, the time between samples. If the program recommends k < 2, then just default to k = 2 (unless you have solved the automated search problem), and if it recommends k > 4, just default to 4.

References:
1. Shewhart, W. A. (1931). Economic Control of Quality of Manufactured Product ISBN 73890760

2. Duncan, A. J. (1956). “The Economic Design of Mean-Charts used to Maintain Current Control of a Process,” Journal of American Statistical Association, Vol. 51, No. 274, pp. 228-242.

3. Chiu, W. K., and Wetherill, G. B. (1974). Journal of Quality Technology, Vol. 6, No. 2.

4. Woodall, W. H. (1986). “Weakness of the Economic Design of Control Charts,” Technometrics, Vol. 28, pp. 408-409.

Discuss

About The Author

John Flaig’s picture

John Flaig

John J. Flaig, Ph.D., is a Fellow of the American Society for Quality and is managing director of Applied Technology (www.e-at-usa.com), a consulting and training company. Dr. Flaig has given lectures and seminars in Europe, Asia, and throughout the United States. His special interests are in statistical process control, process capability analysis, supplier management, design of experiments, and process optimization. He was formerly a member of the Editorial Board of Quality Engineering a journal of the ASQ, and Associate Editor of Quality Technology and Quantitative Management a journal of the International Chinese Association of Quantitative Management.

Comments

A good read indeed!

John:

While I question your source of passion (blasting other articles), I always find them to be a good read … this one being up at the top.

You have potential to develop the next generation of SPC … models, methods, and tools, not just models. Cost / benefit, judging with confidence, flexible sampling and limits based on need, normalcy, autocorrelation, shifts, drifts, and rules that catch things that Western Electric rules don’t catch should all be easily considered as you seem to suggest. I suggest you connect with a stat software company (Dr. Neil Polhemus at Stat Graphics?) to take the common SPC offerings that they all tend to offer and turn it into next gen SPC.

Thanks for giving me another article for my “SPC WOW articles” file.

KN – www.KimNiles.com

A Non-Experts Perspective

John, thank you for an excellent post. I think that it is important for both practitioners and managers to recognize that SPC should be about economical control of processes; not just statistical control.
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However, in ten years of using and studying SPC in several companies, I have never once had the luxury of being able to determine an estimate of the economics of alpha, or the economic consequences of Type I or Type II error. I've worked on colleagues and managers to try to get them to make estimates, and what I find is that (a) the data doesn't exist and (b) no one wants to take the time to guesstimate. Indeed, I have seen people use tightened control limits not based on economical analysis but because they wanted to reduce variation using 100% inspection and were using the natural process limits to set tolerance limits (I'll let the read count how many opportunities for improvement are implied by that statement).
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I have, unquestionably, been living in target-rich environments, having spent most of my time in R,D&E with smaller companies where statistical techniques and SPC are new, and any application of statistical methods represents a vast improvement over previous conditions. However, I have seen this same problem with much larger and more established companies, too. This is clearly the reason that the Shainin Red-X (or GM's "Statistical Engineering") are popular: most people are not in a position to estimate basic statistical factors, let alone economical ones. At the same time, any standard factor, or even a formulaic approach that pre-calculates all statistical factors, is better than whatever was being done previously.
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In short, I think that John's article (and the references) is extremely valuable. You can be sure that I will be saving this article and obtaining the references. Based on my experience and observations, Davis' points are entirely applicable and appropriate to a very broad audience of practitioners, who, for better or worse, are not in environments mature enough to benefit from John's more refined approach.

BRAVO! Tom

Very, VERY astute comments -- and, unfortunately, my industrial experience as well. 


Of course, us folks who love statistics are all-too-eager to apply the (needed) "advanced" stuff.  But, as Tom says, it falls on deaf ears.


As I've broadened my practice to educate people more about "variation," I may be using the "simple" stuff, but, you know what? -- I've never had more fun...or been more effective.


Well done!


Once again, guys, we're BOTH right.


Kind regards,


Davis


 


 

Sampling costs vs. failure costs

I recall learning a procedure to calculate the total cost of quality for acceptance sampling, with the following components: (1) Cost of inspection or testing, (2) Cost to replace nonconforming items caught by the inspection (internal failure), and (3) Cost of failure in the customer's hands (external failure). The external failure cost of something like a pacemaker is obviously unacceptable so 100 percent testing is indicated.    Performance of this kind of calculation for SPC requires accurate knowledge of both the false alarm risk and beta risk (cost of reacting to a nonexistent problem vs. cost of allowing the process to drift out of control), which in turn supports the need to model non-normal processes with non-normal distributions.

"It depends"

To my three distinguished colleagues John, Tom, and Steve,

I hereby anoint all three of you to be in the rarefied "1-2%" to whom I alluded in past articles of those who need and -- as you've all proven -- have advanced statistical knowledge.  I have NO doubt the three of you could blow me out of the water theory-wise (although I do have an M.S. in statistics).

John's article rightfully applies to many, many manufacturing situations...or even some research situations.  There truly is a need for this knowledge...in specific situations where an expert is needed.  This is the type of stuff I did the first 10 years of my career as an industrial statistician....and very few people bothered to listen.  I'm even wondering how many QD readers will listen.

My QD articles mainly address the plague of "statistical training of the masses" caused by Six Sigma for applications to business processes and service industries -- and I have no doubt that all three of you would blow those audiences out of the water, too.  For what purpose?

As Deming wrote to Gerry Hahn (very distinguished applied statistician) in a personal correpondence shown to me in 1984:

"Sorry about your misunderstanding...TOTAL!  When will statisticians wake up?"

But, hey...if I need a Fisher's information calculated, you'll be the first ones I'll call.

Who's "right"?  We're BOTH right--"It depends!"

 

I have a different position

(Sorry about the bullets - all the paragraphs get stuck together making an unreadable wall of text.  This way at least it is an unreadable FORMATTED wall of text...)

  • Davis, I guess I see it differently.  I am often faced with people who think they have been trained to use data to make decisions, but actually have only a "Black Box Black Belt" ("put the number in the software, out pops another number - what's the big deal?")  The problem is that real life is sometimes complicated and not amenable to breezy simplification.  By not understanding what one is doing, one can make really really bad and expensive decisions, like John described in the article.
  • I don't despair when I meet these people, I see it as an opportunity to improve, yes, the world.  These are people who make or enable real decisions with real consequences.  Doing things the right way is really not all that much more difficult than doing it in the "approximately right except when it is drastically wrong" way.  I think we should ask for MORE from our expert problem-solvers (call the Black Belts or SWAT teams or whatever), not dumb things down so they can do less.
  • This very morning I was teaching a class full of working Black Belts who, to their great credit, were confident enough to take my entry-level Intro to Applied Statistics class and are now in the first of three forty hour experimental design classes.  What they all said in the first class was that while they had been working as Black Belts, they wanted to take the class because they were smart enough to know that there was something missing, and that "something" had not been in their BB training.  It turns out that they are now learning a lot of really practical and useful information that they are already putting into practice to save the company money, time, and liability exposure.  Heck, my Black Belt training covers most of it in four weeks - its not like I even need more time to teach them the right way than the "Black Box Black Belts" get.
  • I am an engineer by training, not a statistician, and what I teach (and write about) is practical, not theoretical.  (Or rather not more theoretical than it needs to be to get the job done right.)  The way I learned to do things are one-degree of separation from Deming (my mentor and colleague worked with him at Ford), so I am confident I am solid ground there.  My experience is that whether you are working for a multi-billion dollar company or for a start-up, doing things the right way is the more economical (and less dangerous) way of doing things.  I have just seen too many situations where people skip steps, use approximations and assumptions, and end up paying a high price later for the supposed shortcut.
  • I also get asked, "Can you teach us DOE in 3 days?"  Well, no, it is impossible, at least in a way that would allow you to make a business decisions.  I am not willing to incur the karma of training someone, slinking away with the cash, and having my earstwhile students think they know something about data while making terrible decisions.

I guess we agree to disagree


  • One step removed from Deming, eh?  Ever heard of Funnel Rule 4?

  • You certainly like to train, don't you?  As a friend of mine likes to say, "Would you rather your kids had sex 'education' or sex 'training'?"   People don't need statistics, they need to know how to solve their problems. 

  • Ever notice how much "training" Deming did in his seminars?  Virtually none.  It was all about a deep, deep understanding of variation...but mostly about THINKING differently and asking better questions.

  • And then there is the most nontrival "human" variation in application of any training...which NO statistical technique is prepared to handle.

  • From your articles, I have absolutely NO doubt that you are a good trainer and get great reviews -- like me in my past life as an industrial statistician working with engineers.  So what?  Ultimately, I wasn't very effective -- and the very talented  internal statistical consulting group of which I was part (3M) went bust -- as did those of DuPont, Kodak. GE (top of mind) and others.

  • YOU CAN'T MAKE UP what I saw people subsequently do with the material!--As Deming says:

--"You cannot hear what you do not understand."
  
--"Information is not knowledge.  Let's not confuse the two."
 
--"We know what we told him but we don't know what he heard."
 
[Taken from "The Best of Deming" by Ron McCoy]
  

Davis' Experiences Are Different Than Mine

  • Davis, I'm not sure what assumptions you are making about what I do and how I do it, but I would encourage you to consider that those assumptions might not be entirely consistent with what I actually do.  This is not really the place to toot my own horn, but let me point out that what I aim for, and I think achieve, is a practical approach to solving problems and improving processes, and I do that through, yes, training and on-site consulting.
  • (Would you rather your kids had problem-solving education or training?  See I'd vote for training there since it implies some sort of hands-on competency.  Either way, paralleling that to sex education is...special.)
  • I figure that I can help them make clients' process better (giving them fish) and I can help them learn how to make their process better on their own going forward (teaching them to fish) to whatever level they want to learn and that makes sense for that organization.  The analogy we use is that the basic tools of quality are sufficient to capture the low-hanging fruit in a process naive to them (and I have seen even just a flow chart save $10,000 a month, an SOP $14,000 a month) but that once you have captured that, you will need a more and more advanced understanding of what your data are telling you in order to extract actionable knowledge from them (get the higher, sweeter fruit).  And in the real world and in the presence of variation, that means one of the things you need to understand and use are increasingly advanced statistics.  This does not denigrate any of the other tools (in fact some of the most fun I have consulting is working with hourly employees building front-line process management systems) it merely recognizes that to get the "higher sweeter fruit" you need another level of sophistication.  When I helped a client to solve a problem that was endemic to their product for 35 years - and found three different ways to do it - it required of the teams a deep knowledge of what is actually going on 1) in the process (SOP, control charts, creating trust in the workers, etc.), 2) measurement system analysis (repeated measures ANOVA, control theory), and 3) fractional factorials, and all the foundational stats supporting these three things.  I wish all problems could be solved by the seven basic tools, and that control charts are black boxes from which new knowledge comes - it would make my job a lot easier, but the fact is that they can't and they aren't.
  • The purpose of Deming's seminars was not to train - the purpose of the seminars was to drive the recognition of the need for change.  Make no mistake though, the training came after that.  I would not serve my clients well if I were to go in, show them how my amazing stuff could make them more profit, and then say, "OK have fun with that!" and drop it in their lap without actually giving them the tools to do anything to make it happen.  Deming didn't do that either, which is why Deming brought my mentor and colleague into Ford to train, and why Ford manufacturing endowed a chair specifically for him (the only time it did so).   Ever heard of Deming's formula for culture change? D x V x F > R
  • I can't comment on why you and your colleagues were not effective at 3M - I have no idea as there are many variables.  I can tell you that my colleagues and I were extremely effective in a number of manufacturing, transactional and service industries, and that our ROI was over 14,000% as calculated by one of our clients over about five years of consulting.  There are many potential reasons behind why you have not observed advanced statistical tools being effective, but just because that is what you have experienced does not mean that the tools are ineffective, only that you have seen them to be so.  Management ignorance, statistical misapplications, and assumptions can all lead to failures, but that is not to say failure is the only option.  It DOES take FAR more than teaching a stats class to optimize the probability of success, of course.  If that is all that is done, you can bet on spectacular and expensive failure sooner or later - the literature is crowded with examples like that.  In fact, as I recall, I have mentioned this in an article or two for QD.
  • I am not an academician; I am an engineer at heart.  What I teach and how I consult is, I think I can say without fear of contradiction, effective, practical, saves my clients and students money that in some cases they didn't even think they were losing, and it pays off.  Advanced statistics are a tool in the toolbox, certainly not the only one.  But incorrectly applied statistics as a decision-making heuristic can, and eventually will, cause very expensive poor decisions to be made.  And really, that was my only point in my first posting - John's article shows why a surface understanding of SPC can lead one to make dangerous decisions with disastrous consequences.
  • Hmm, also in looking over my response I want to be clear that I am not insulting or insinuating anything about Davis, just that I have seen a very different reality than he has.  If I had his experiences, no doubt I would be arguing his side of the case.  But just because he has not seen a black swan does not mean they don't exist.  "Criticism is the only known antidote to error!"

Thomas

Thomas Pyzdek
http://www.sixsigmatraining.org/store

Thanks for presenting a scientific approach. It seems that some of my colleagues are approaching the subject of process control and improvement dogmatically rather than rationally.

Well done!

John, nice article.  People who understand a little bit (enough to be dangerous) of what Shewhart was saying end up making all sorts of silly statements justified because "Shewhart's limits are economical, not statistical!"  He and Deming well understood statistics as the foundation of a decision-making heuristic for the real world, not because inferential statistics are "real" but because it is a process to follow to consistently make economical decisions.  This harkens back to Deming's often-misunderstood enumerative vs. analytic dichotomy.  You managed to explain Shewhart's reasoning in a way that is clear and cogent.  Well done!

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